8th September (Location: Huygens building, room HG 00.128)
10.30 - 11.30 : Richard Smith -- Modeling plant development, L-systems and beyond.
11.30 - 12.00 Coffee Break
12.00 - 13.00 : Jesse Dorrestijn -- Probabilistic cellular automata: an application in atmospheric sciences. (abstract)
13.00 - 14.30 Lunch Break
14.30 - 15.30 : Johan Gielis -- Gielis Transformations in mathematics and the natural sciences (abstract)
15.30 - 16.00 Coffee Break
16.00 - 16.30 : Diego Caratelli -- Completing Fourier’s project in mathematical physics (abstract)
16.30 - 17:00 : Baltasar Trancon y Widemann -- tba
18.00 - ... Dinner at Vlaams Arsenaal, Arsenaalpoort 1-4, 6511 PN Nijmegen
9th September (Location: Linnaeus building, room LIN5)
10.30 - 11.30 : Krzysztof Apt -- A Mini Tutorial on Finite Extensive Games. (abstract below)
11.30 - 12.00 Coffee Break
12.00 - 13.00 : Samson Abramsky -- Coalgebraic Analysis of Subgame-perfect Equilibria in Infinite Games without Discounting
13.00 - 14.30 Lunch Break
14.30 - 15.30 : Philipp Zahn -- A Higher-Order Framework for Decision Problems and Games. (abstract below)
15.30 - 16.00 Coffee Break
16.00 - 17.00 : Daniela Petrisan -- Coinduction up-to in a fibrational setting.
Abstract Apt
The aim of this tutorial is to introduce the most fundamental concepts concerning extensive games that are played a finite number of rounds. No knowledge of the subject is assumed. We shall begin by discussing strategic games, in which the players take their actions simultaneously, and introduce the fundamental notion of a Nash equilibrium. Subsequently we shall discuss the so-called Zermelo result about the game of chess. Finally we shall introduce the refinement of a Nash equilibrium, called a subgame perfect equilibrium, and discuss its relation with the procedure of backward induction.
Abstract Zahn
We introduce a new unified framework for modelling both decision problems and finite games based on quantifiers and selection functions. We show that the canonical utility maximization is one special case of a quantifier and that our more abstract framework provides several additional degrees of freedom in modelling. In particular, incomplete preferences, non-maximizing heuristics, and context-dependent mo- tives can be taken into account when describing an agent’s goal. We introduce a suitable generalization of Nash equilibrium for games in terms of quantifiers and selection functions. Moreover, we introduce a refinement of Nash that captures context-dependency of goals. Mod- elling in our framework is compositional as the parts of the game are modular and can be easily exchanged. We provide an extended ex- ample where we illustrate concepts and highlight the benefits of our alternative modelling approach.
(joint with Jules Hedges, Paulo Oliva, Evguenia Winschel, Viktor Winschel)